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IN THE

SUPRE~ffi

COURT OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAN ANDREWS 1
Petitioner-Appellant,
Case No.
16168

-vsLAWRENCE NORRIS, as Warden
of the Utah State Prison,
Respondent-Appellee.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

INTRODUCTORY STATENENT
It has been respondent's position consistently
that all issues raised in appellant's petition for habeas
corpus in the lower court were purely legal in nature and
could be disposed of as matters of law.

Thus, respondent

moved to dismiss the petition alternatively on the merits
and on the basis of the waiver doctrine.

This Court

agreed with respondent and, although disposing of the
petition on the waiver doctrine, additionally reached
the merits and ruled on them as a matter of law.
Therefore, contrary to appellant's contention in his
petition for rehearing that no "full hearing" has ever
been granted, respondent submits that th.is Court, by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dealing fully and completely with all issues asserted by
appellant after full briefing of those issues and oral
argument thereon, has effectively accorded appellant .
full opportunity to argue the legal merits of his claims
in the numerous proceedings up to this present petition for
rehearing.

Thus, a full hearing or airing of the issues has

been allowed.
As for appellant's argument that he has been
requesting a continuance throughout this entire proceeding,
the record of the November 29-30, 1978, habeas corpus
hearing clearly reflects that no such continuance was
requested.

Appellant never asked for additional time to

prepare for argument on the respondent's motion to dismiss.
Respondent fails to see where a continuance was requested
by appellant on pages 26-27, 29 of the November 30, 1978,
transcript, although vague references were made as to the
need to brief some of the issues addressed at the hearing.
This was done when appellant appealed the dismissal of his
habeas corpus petition to this Court.

Appellant is now

presenting a duplicative argument of these issues again
here.
Finally,

~t

the outset, respondent submits that

the sound, universally-accepted criteria for determining
whether a factual evidentiary hearing is necessary has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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been observed in this case.

In Spinkellink v. Wainwright,
~·denied

578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978),

440

u.s.

976

(1979), the Court ruled that such hearings are only proper
when factual issues, as to the facts in the case itself,
are in question.

The Court held:

• . if only questions of law
are involved, an evidentiary hearing
to develop fully the facts underlying
a petitioner's complaints would be
pointless.
578 F.2d at 590.
This court recognized and adopted this standard
in the present case.

In Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed

February 13, 1980, this Court held:
. where it affirmatively appears
from the petition that a petitlcner is
not entitled to the writ, an evldentlary
hearing is unnecessary. Hence, if the
petition raises legal questions only, an
evidentiary hearing to fully develop the
underlying facts would be pointless, and is
not required.
Advance sheet, at page 7.

Respondent submits that this

view is correct and continues to be so at this stage of
the rehearing process as well.
POINT I
APPELLANT HAS NOT RAISED ANY ISSUES WHICH
\"OULD JUSTIFY A REHEARING IN THIS MATTER.
In cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac.
619 (1913), this Court noted:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
'-.
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When this court • . • has considered and
decided all of the material questions involved
in a case, a rehearing should not be applied
for, unless we have misconstrued or overlooked
some material or facts, or have overlooked
some statute or decision which may affect tbe
result, or that we have based the decision
on some wrong principle of law, or have
either misapplied or overlooked something
which materially affects the result.
!d. at 624 (emphasis_ added).
The Court had much earlier noted that a rehearing
would not be allowed where the petitioner sought merely
to reargue the case and presented no new facts or law.
Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah 483, 11 Pac. 618 at 619 (1886).
See also Yearian v. Spiers, 4 Utah 482, 11 Pac. 618 (1886).
The standards set forth in these cases is repeated and
explained in more recent decisions from other jurisdictions.
In Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 239 A.2d 793 at 796
(1968), the court said:
Supreme Court Rule 71 states, inter alia,
that the petition for reargument "must specify
particuarly the point supposed to have been
overlooked or misapprehended by the Court."
Certainly, it cannot be said that our Court
"misapprehended" the Pointer claim, since
it was never in fact ra~sed.
Furthermore,
we believe that a proper interpretation of
the term "overlooked" in the rule would
require a showing that our Court failed to
consider some finding of fact or proposition
of law relevant to the disposition of an issue
actually raised by the parties.
It does not
mean that reargument may be granted simply
because one of the parties "overlooked" a
relevant issue.
Thus, in the present case,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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since Cheeks' petition failed to show either
that the Court misapprehended or overlooked
any point raised in his appeal, the petition
was properly denied without ever reaching
the merits of the Pointer claim therein
asserted. (Emphasis 1n original~)
In Sarmiento v. State, 371 So.2d 1047 at 1053 (Fla. App.
1979), the Florida court rejected the State's petition for
rehearing stating:
[The] • . • argument, however, was
never raised by the state either in its
main brief or on oral argument in this cause
and was in no way overlooked by this court.
It cannot, therefore, be raised for the
first time on a motion for rehearing.
See also Davis v. State, 400 A.2d 292 at 299 (Del. 1979).
Finally, in United States v. Sutherland, 428 F.2d 1152
at 1158

(5th Cir. 1970), the court rejected a

peL~Llo~

for

rehearing and said:
The point was not raised in the
court below nor has it been previously
raised in this court. Having tried and
appealed its case on one theory, an
unsuccessful party may not then use a petition
for rehearing as a device to test a new theory.
(Emphasis in original.)
Clearly, new issues may not be raised via petition
for rehearing.

Moreover, a petition for rehearing should

not be used to re-present arguments "based upon later
discovered and subsequent authority."
P.2d 369 (Wyo. 1977).

Ash v. State, 560

Rehearings should only be granted

when the court has misconstrued or misapplied the facts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
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or the law as presented and argued on appeal.

As this

Court said in Beaver County v. Howe Indemnity Co.,
88 Utah 1, 52 P.2d 435 (1935):
If an opinion is to be modified
it should be modified because it fails
to correctly state the law, or for some
other reason which makes its language
or statements improper or inapplicable.
Id. at 459.
In Ash v. State, supra at 370, the dissenting
opinion noted further that no rehearing should be granted
unless there is a reasonable probability that the court
may have arrived at an erroneous conclusion or overlooked
some important matter necessary to a correct decision.
Applying these standards to the instant petition,
respondent submits that no rehearing should be allowed.
Appellant challenges this court's decision on a number of
grounds, all of which have either been specifically
considered or never raised.

A careful reading of

appellant's brief discloses the fact that all the
issues raised have or could have been dealt with within
the regular appellate processes and should not now be
considered via a petition for rehearing.
In Point I appellant argues, first,

that not

all of appellant's claims were addressed by this Court's
opinion.

It is clear, nevertheless, that, given the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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action of this Court in affirming the dismissal of
appellant's habeas corpus complaint, this Court rejected
all of appellant's claims.

Appellant does not indicate

any instance wherein this Court has affirmatively
misconstrued or misstated the law with respect to
these claims or arrived at an improper

conclusio~.

This Court is simply being asked to consider the same
issues over again.

There is no reasonable probability

that such a consideration will produce a different
result.
Appellant argues, further, in Point I, that the
recent decision of State v. Brown, No. 15481, filed
February 7, 1980, is inconsistent with the court's oplnion
in this matter.

The specific issues addressed by State v.

Brown have never been raised in this case and should not
be considered at this stage.

See Commonwealth v. Cheeks,

Sarmiento v. State and United States v. Sutherland, all
(See a full discussion of State v. Brown,

~.)

In his second point, although appellant claims
that the court's opinion "misconstrues the record,"
appellant also fails to raise a claim which justifies
a rehearing.

This court has considered the record in this

matter on several different occasions.

Appellant does no

more in this instance than to disagree with the Court on
what the testimony reveals the facts to be.

Although he

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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points to portions of the record which, he says,
indicate mistakes in the Court's characterization of the
facts, the Court's conclusions may also be supported by
references to the record.

Moreover, appellant specifically

raised the question of proof of his direct involvement

in the killings in the previous appeal (see Andrews v. Morris,
Brief of Appellant at p. 22).

His claim in this instance

amounts to nothing more than a request for this Court to
reverse itself on an issue already considered explictly.
Appellant has not shown that this Court affirmatively
misconstrued the facts nor has he raised a reasonable
possibility that the Court might reverse itself.
Appellant's third point also fails to demonstrate
a mistake which would necessitate a rehearing.

He points

to no law or facts which were misconstrued but argues,
instead, that "a growing body of literature"

(Appellant's

Brief at p. 12) is in conflict with the conclusion of
this Court.

Again, no reasonable likelihood of reversal

is raised because of a demonstrated misappalication of law
or fact.
In summary, a rehearing should only be granted
when it is demonstrated that the Court has misconstrued
the facts or misapplied the law with respect to issues
raised and considered on appeal.

Rehearings should

not be forums for the consideration of issues never
Sponsored
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rejected be reconsidered.

Appellant has failed to

demonstrate a reasonable possibility that this Court
would reverse itself because of any error in
application of law or fact to issues considered in
the previous appeal of this matter.

A rehearing should

not be allowed.
POINT II
THIS COURT HAS PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL
OF APPELLANT' S CLAIMS RELATIVE TO THE
ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
UTAH DEATH PENALTY AND SUCH CONSIDERATION
IS FURTHERMORE CONSISTENT WITH STATE V. BROWN.
Respondent submits that the majority of the issues
appellant is now raising have been fully dealt with in the
several proceedings prior to this present action.

For the

Court's convenience, respondent will summarize these
issues as argued in appellant's brief, Point I and then
indicate where the issue has been previously ruled on:
1.

sentencing authority has "unguided and

unfettered discretion" to choose which defendant will be
sentenced to death--State v. Pierre, appellant's brief
(appellant Andrews adopted the bulk of appellant Pierre's
brief) at pages 14-15; State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1345;
Andrews v. Utah, appellant's petition for certiorari to the
Supreme court of the United States, at pages 27-29

(~.

den. Oct. 2, 1978); Andrews v. Morris, appellant's amended
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors. '-.

-9-

petition for habeas corpus, at page 4; Andrews v. Morris,
appellant's brief, at page 21; and Andrews v. Morris,
No. 16168, filed Feb. 13, 1980, at pages 9-10 (advance
sheet) •
2.

sentencing authority not required to make

findings--Andrews v. Utah, appellant's petition for
certiorari, at pages 15-18; Andrews v. Morris,
appellant's amended petition for habeas corpus, at page
4; Andrews v. Morris, appellant's brief, at page 21; and
Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed February 13, 1980, at
page 10.
3.

aggravating circumstances not pled by the

state, found by the jury or specified in the verdict-State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1345; Andrews v. Utah,
appellant's petition for certiorari, at page 15; Andrews
v. Morris, amended petition for

habeas corpus, at page

5; Andrews v. Morris, appellant's brief at page 21; and
Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed February 13, 1980
at page 10.
4.

aggravating circumstances were not limited

to those enumerated by the state--State v. Pierre,
appellant's brief at page 16; State v. Pierre, 5i2 P.2d
at 1345; Andrews v. Utah, appellant's petition for
certiorari, at pages 29-31; Andrews v. Morris, amended
petition for habeas corpus, at pages 5-6; Andrews v.
Morris, appellant's brief, at pages 20-21; and Andrews
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of'·.Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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v. Morris, No. 16168, filed February 13, 1980, at pages
9-10.
5.

no standards to guide jury (see infra on

State v. Brown discussion)--State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at.
1345; Andrews v. Utah, appellant's petition for certiorari,
at pages 15-18; Andrews v. Morris, amended petition for
habeas corpus, at pages 6-7; Andrews v. Morris, appellant's
brief, at page 21; and Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed
Feb. 13, 1980, at pages 9-10.
6.

insufficient record for this Court's review--

Andrews v. Morris, amended petition for habeas corpus,
at pages 8-9; Andrews v, Morris, appellant's brief, at
pages ll-14; and Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168,

f::_::.2~

Feb. 13, 1980, at pages 7-8.
Furthermore, in addition to the above references
wherein these issues have been addressed, respondent
makes these additional observations:

as to (2) there

is no need for the lower court to make findings where
the transcript of the penalty phase is available for
review; as to (3)

the jury does not need to find each

aggravating circumstance unanimously; no United States
Supreme Court case requires this; as to (4) it is totally
permissible to allow evidence of aggravating circumstances
other than those statutorily specified; and as to (5),
Jurek v. Texas, 429 U.S. 875 (1976), upholds the Texas
death penalty which statute does not raBuire additional
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written findings to be made after a guilty verdict to
support a death sentence, contrary to appellant's
assertion.
Thus, as outlined in Point I, this petition
may not be granted inasmuch as these above issues have
been exhaustively dealt with by this Court and the United
States Supreme Court.

These issues simply have been

raised and considered.
Appellant argues in Point I

that the evidence

presented at sentencing phase was made with a "total
lack of restrictions • .

• so that

.

• • not even

constitutional evidentiary limitations were observed.
Respondent submits that the evidence presented by the
State at sentencing was, in fact, not only properly
within the bounds of constitutional guidelines but,
furthermore, was very minimal.
witnesses:

The State put on three

Dr. Louis G. Moench, a psychiatrist, who

examined appellant Pierre and testified he was able to
distinguish between right and wrong and that he had found
no evidence of any mental disease or defect in appellant
Pierre (Tr.4129-2137); Lt. John Regni,

the Hill Air

Force Base personnel officer who testified regarding
appellants'Andrews and Pierre work records and
disciplinary measures taken against them (Tr.4137-4161);
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and Allen Roe, a clinical psychologist at the utah
State Prison who testified as to the average time served
by inmates who have been sentenced to life imprisonment_
(Tr.4162-4194).

Also the State had read into the

record a letter from the Bexar County, Texas, Adult
Probation Office, which revoked appellant Andrews'
Parole.

The State then rested.
Appellant relies on Smith v. Estelle, 602

F.2d 694

(5th Cir. 1979), for the proposition that

appellants

were not given adequate notice of the

State's inculpatory or aggravating evidence.

However,

the facts of Smith are starkly distinguishable frorr.
facts in this matter.

~je

In Smith a petition for habeas

corpus was successful where the petitioner's claim of
unfair surprise--a psychiatrist's testimony during the penalty
phase --was deemed a substantial denial of his rights.
The prosecution in Smith had, according to the court,
"intentionally omitted Dr. Grigson's name from the witness
list," Id., at 702,and such action left the petitioner "at
best, not fully prepared."

Id.

Another important factor

in Smith is that the petitioner was never informed that the
examination he had with Dr. Grigson "concerned more than
Smith's competence to stand trial."

Id. at 703.

Rather,

the examination was employed to gather additional evidence
to support the State's capital case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the present matter the intended use of
Dr. Moench's testimony was clearly a known fact.
The psychiatrist here, in fact, was initially
employed by the appellant Pierre (Tr.4130), and the
trial court eventually ordered an examination as well.
A discussion was had, out of the presence of the jury
(Tr.4129-4134), wherein appellant contended that the
information garnered from the doctor's interview with
appellant Pierre was the work product of counsel and
that his testimony could not be entered without
appellant's consent (Tr.4130).

The court ruled that

Dr. Moench could only testify concerning his general
impression as to appellant's sanity and that any
additional facts derived from the examination would be
protected under an attorney work product privilege and/or
a doctor-patient privilege (Tr.4133-4134).
In open court, Dr. Moench testified very
generally, as ordered by the court at appellant's
insistence, as to appellant Pierre's ability to
distinguish right and wrong both legally and morally
(Tr.4135-4136) and that appellant Pierre did not have
any mental defect or illness (Tr.4136).
The other two state witnesses were likewise
not of the Smith type.

Appellant had notice of their

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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being intended witnesses and no objections as to surprise
were made by appellant.

Thus, respondent contends that

no Smith v. Estelle issue is present in the instant matter
and that a review of Smith shows that the notice defect
there is absent here.

Appellant had notice of all

statutory aggravating circumstances as well as the
witnesses the State intended to call at the penalty phase.
It should also be noted that the United States Supreme
Court granted the State of Texas' petition for certiorari in
the Smith case earlier this month.

Thus, the question of the

use of such psychiatric testimony at the penalty phase
is presently under review by that Court.
Appellant next asserts that juries

s~s~ld

-ot

be permitted to sentence a convicted murderer to life
or death "without even saying why.
at page 4).

.

" (Appellant's Brief

Such an approach, however, is too mechanical.

Furman v. Georgia, 408

u.s.

238 (1972), simply requires that

a state have procedures which guarantee that the death
penalty is not unbridled or freakish in its application
so as to minimize the risk of arbitrary jury reactions.
Respondent has repeatedly shown that the State of Utah's
death penalty statute has such guarantees.

The present

system, furthermore, provides that a transcript of the
evidence presented at the penalty phase be available to ensure
a convicted person of an accurate and fair review on appeal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It

remains, though, a fact of judicial life that absolute
certainty can never be achieved regarding what actually
motivates a jury to impose a death sentence.

Jury

deliberations are not recorded and, consequently, the
deliberative process remains a sacred secret in any
state's system, including those of Georgia, Florida
and Texas, which have been expressly upheld by the United
States Supreme court.
Respondent takes issue with appellant's
characterization of the jury's sole guideline in this
case as being what the jurors "found 'appropriate'".
A review of the jury instructions (Tr.4272-4277) reveals
that the court emphasized that "the burden of proof to
satisfy the jury that a death sentence is appropriate
is on the State." (Tr.4273).

In instruction number 4,

the court enumerated the factors the jury would consider
in determining what the proper sentence should be in

the case (see Tr.4274-4275).

Instruction number 6

stated that each defendant's culpability must be judged
independently and that each sentence must be separately
supported (Tr.4275-4276).
Thus to characterize the instructions as being
based "only on what the jury found 'appropriat<e'" is
a gross misstatement.

(Appellant's brief at page 4.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The major thrust of appellant's Point I is
that this Court's recent decision in State v. Brown,
No. 15481, filed Feb. 7, 1980 (six (6) days before
the Court's decision here) allegedly sets forth new
standards which affect appellant's sentence.

Appellant

contends that evidence was admitted at the penalty
phase in violation of Brown; specifically:

penological

theory and religious opinion, evidence of appellant's work
performance and mental health which allegedly included
hearsay on hearsay and factually inaccurate
testimony.

(See discussion, supra, as per the mental

status evidence argument.)

Respondent will comment-·'

each of these purportedly improper testimonies.
The evidence regarding penological theory and
religious opinion was presented by Gerald Smith and
Frazier Crocker, respectively, both of whom were called
as defense witnesses (Tr.4198-4231;4234-4247).

Respondent

submits that if this evidence was inappropriate the
responsibility for such error lies with appellant--not
respondent.

Furthermore, although the respondent finds

the evidence of little relevance to the questions before
the jury at the penalty phase, nonetheless, the evidence
presented was not inflammatory or prejudicial as was the
improper evidence at issue in Brown.

Thus, this evidence
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cannot adversely affect the sentence in the present case.
The testimony appellant alleges included hearsay
on hearsay and which contained factually inaccurate
also fails to meet the Brown prohibition.

ev~dence

Appellant cites

to Lt. John Regni's testimony as an example of hearsay on
hearsay (Tr.4142-4148).

This cite refers to the testimony

Lt. Regni offered regarding appellant's work record at
Hill Air Force Base.

Lt. Regni testified from the official

records, Unfavorable Information File (Tr.4141), of all
disciplinary action taken against appellant (Tr.4137-4140).
These actions were three letters of reprimand, an "Article
15" action (discipline in lieu of court martial) and a
vacation of the suspended reduction in appellant's
classification to a grade E-1, airman basic (Tr.4142-4145).
Such evidence as a record made in the regular course of
business,

is clearly an exception to the hearsay rule (see

Rule 63 (13), Utah Rules of Evidence).

Furthermore,

appellant's only objection to this information--that Lt.
Regni was not the custodian of the records (Tr.4141,4148)-was specifically refuted by the State.
question,

"~'lho

"Sir, I do.

In response to a

keeps those files?", Lt. Regni testified,

I am the custodian for them"

(Tr.4150).

The hearsay on hearsay claim must therefore be
rejected.

The similar claim in Brown is much different.

In Brown a State's witness testified at,penalty phase
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that he heard a declarant testify in another case that
defendant Brown had stated, "I just head-shot two
f------ for messing with my brother."
at page 11.

State v. Brown,

Actually, defendant did make the comment

but it did not include the inflammatory, prejudicial
obscenity.

"Hearsay on

admissible hearsay",

~at

p.

14, was the additional, crucial factor which led this
Court to reduce Brown's sentence to life imprisonment.
Neither of these factors is present in the instant
matter:

the hearsay was admissible; no prejudicial

evidence, as per Brown, was presented.
One additional factor must be considered as
to appellant's contention that State v. Brown has affect
on this present case.

The court in Brown refers frequently

to the fact that:
in capital cases, this Court,
sua sponte, considers manifest and prejudicial
error though such error may neither be
assigned nor argued, combine to provide for
a comprehensive review of the entire case,
including the sentence of death, to determine
if that sentence resulted from prejudice or
arbitrary action or was disproportionate
and excessive in relation to the offense
for which defendant was convicted.
Advance sheet, at pages 9-10 (emphasis added}.

This

principle was first announced in State v. Stenback,
78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931).

The principle was most
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assuredly used in this case as well since a triple first
degree murder conviction is at issue.

Thus, under this quoted

Stenback doctrine, respondent submits that the Court no
doubt considered any affect_its Brown decision would have
on the present case since Brown was filed nearly one
week earlier than Andrews v. Morris, and both cases
were under advisement at the same time.

Since no Brown

issues are mentioned in Andrews, presumably the Court
considered none to exist and consequently affirmed the
dismissal of appellant's petition for habeas corpus.
Thus,

the Stenback doctrine is a further bar to

appellant's petition for rehearing.
As to the asserted factually inaccurate testimony,
appellant cites to page 4167 of the transcript wherein
Allen Roe, a clinical psychologist at the Utah State
Prison, was pressed by appellant Pierre's counsel to name
three cases where a released inmate, who had been sentenced
to life imprisonment on a first degree murder cc-viction,
committed another murder.

Mr. Roe, after

protes~ing

he

could not be sure of his recollection, named three persons
he believed fell into that category (Tr.4167).

Whether

or not the information Hr. Roe gave was accurate is not
clear from the record.

Assuming, arguendo, that it was

inaccurate, respondent submits that the hard-pressed
recollection is so collateral and irrelevant to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute
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essential issues before the jury at that stage that
it cannot be said to have prejudiced the jury as
perhaps was the case in

~·

This claim, therefore,

must also be rejected.
As to the jury instructions being inadequate
in view of the Brown requirements, this Court recognized
in Brown that State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977) ·
"was the first case involving capital offenses under the
criminal code enacted in 1973 "(State v. Brown, note 15,
page 14) and in that case (State v. Pierre) the court
first established that the burden of proof in capital
cases is that "the totality of aggravating circumstances
must • •

outweigh the totality of mitigating c::cc·uiTcstances·."

Pierre, at 1347-1348.

However, in analyzing the jury

instructions' sufficiency as per the Pierre standard in
the present case, this Court concluded:
We believe the District Court's
instruction thereon satisfied that
requirement in this case. And ln our
appellate review of this matter we
conclude that the aggravating circumstances
were overwhelmingly present against the
defendant and the mitigating circumstances
favoring him most minimal--even from the
point of view of inference.
572 P.2d at 1348 (emphasis added).

This ruling completely

forecloses any discussion regarding the jury instructions
at penalty phase in this case.

Such a specific holding
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cannot be thwarted with an inferential reference to the
Brown decision, decided more than two years after State
v. Pierre.
Finally, appellant again advances the theory
that more time is needed to ensure the consistent
application of capital punishment especially as per the
Brown case.

Respondent directs the Court's attention

to the reference to Spinkellink v. Wainwright, supra at
pages 12-13 of Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, and submits
that this Court's adoption of the Spinkellink position is
dispositive on this point.

The State cannot be kept in

abeyance in its application of the death penalty, waiting
for further case law development in order to guarantee
that all hypothetical contingencies are resolved.

As

Spinkellink notes, if this were done "[t)he process would
be neverending and the benchmark for comparison would be
chronically undefined."

Id. at 605.

In conclusion, respondent would emphasize that
the fundamental, essential requirements of the major
United States Supreme Court cases have been met here.
The Furman

requira~ent

been satisfied.

of minimizing jury arbitrariness has

The Supreme Court standards do not require

states to provide pure, surgically sterile proceedings,
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devoid of all discretion, deliberative secrets and case-by-case
inconsistency.

The high Court requires that their pronounce-

ments, as previously discussed, be observed.

That has

been done here.
Respondent suggests that the time has come to
put an end to the moritorium on the death penalty
presently in existence in the State of Utah.
POINT III
THIS COURT HAS ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED AND
REJECTED APPELLANT'S CLAIM THAT HE DID NOT
INTEND TO CAUSE THE DEATH OF THE VICTIMS.
As in Point II, respondent will summarize the
issues appellant raises in his Point II and show where
these have been exhaustively dealt with:
1.

appellant Andrews was not proven to have

intended the death of the victims--State v. Andrews,
574 P.2d at 710-711; Andrews v. Morris, appellant's
amended petition for habeas corpus, at page 9; Andrews
v. Morris, appellant's brief, at page 22; and
Andrews v. Morris, No.

16168, filed Feb. 13, 1980, at

page 11.
2.

the Court dismissed the petition without

reviewing the transcript--Andrews v. Morris, appellant's
brief, at page 11; and Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed
Feb. 13, 1980, at pages 7-8.
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3.

the mitigating evidence outweighed the

aggravating evidence--Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed
Feb. 13, 1980, at page 10.
Respondent here again asserts the legal
principles regarding petitions for rehearing as
outlined supra in Point I.

Since this present petition

fails to meet these requirements on the issues raised
in appellant's Point II, the petition for rehearing
should be denied.
Respondent will now comment on each of these
issues in greater detail in chronological order as
they appear in appellant's brief.

First, appellant

again asserts his supposed need for an evidentiary
hearing.

Here, however, this need is based on the

proposition that "the difficulties of assessing the
record" cannot be made "without a full hearing on it."
Respondent disagrees.

Such a hearing would solely

attempt to develop factual issues which this Court
determined were not even present since the issues are
purely legal in nature and subject to dismissal as a matter
of law as per Spinkellink and Andrews v. Morris, both
supra.

Furthermore, such an evidentiary hearing is

unnecessary if, as a matter of law, the State is not
required to specifically allege and prove that appellant
Andrews intended the deaths of the victims beyond what
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y.

Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), infra.)
Appellant next complains that this Court's
statement on page 10 of Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, as to the
aggravating and mitigating evidence presented, is inaccurate.
Respondent submits that given the tremendous weight of
aggravating circumstances in this case, the Court's
observation is correct.

This Court has twice reviewed the

record and has twice rejected appellant assertion of lack
of intent as to the deaths of the victims.

Appellant's

characterization of the facts has simply not been accepted
by the Court.
The central issue in appellant's Point II involves
the arguments made in the concurring
in Lockett v. Ohio, supra.

opinio~

of Justice White

The Lockett case imrolved five

persons in the murder-robbery of a pawnbroker. Petitioner
Lockett, the getaway car driver, was convicted of aggravated
murder and aggravated robbery and sentenced to death.

Her

sentence was reversed on appeal because the Ohio statute
under which she was sentenced did not give the sentencer
enough discretion in considering mitigating factors of
the criminal's character, circumstances of the offense,
and like considerations.

In a concurring opinion, Justice

1-lhi te agreed with the plurality decision that this basic
flaw in the statute was sufficient to reverse her death
sentence, but also argued that her sentence should be
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reversed because she did not intend the death of the victim.
He contended that:
• it violates the Eighth
Amendment to impose the penalty of
death without a finding that the
defendant possessed a purpose to
cause the death of the victim."
438

u.s.

at 624.
The defect in the Lockett case is not present

here.

Appellant Andrews' participation in this crime has

been reviewed by this Court and found to be of the type
required by Utah law to result in the death penalty.
Appellant actively participated with appellant Pierre in
torturing and murdering the helpless victims.
purposefully helped administer the

He

Drano to the victims.

His was not the passive participation of a getaway car
driver.

The facts of the trial speak for themselves, as

was outlined by the State in its brief in opposition to
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court in Andrews v.
Utah.

This statement of facts is helpful in response

to appellant's claims here and is therefore set out in
full in Appendix A for the Court's reference.

This

statement of facts shows that the two appellants acted in
concert with each other in the commission of the murders.
Much like one defendant stablizing a gun while the other
pulls the trigger or one holding a victim secure while the
other kills him, the two appellants both intended the murders
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of the victims in this case.

As to appellant's assertion

that he "had argued with [Pierre] and left" before
any of the shootings, such is not well-established by
the evidence.

Orren Walker merely stated that while

lying face down on the floor, he did not hear appellant
Andrews after a certain point.

Appellant certainly

did not provide evidence that he, in fact, left.
Appellant concedes that the jury could properly
find that Andrews remained with Pierre, yet somehow contends
that appellant meets the Justice White test in Lockett of
not intending the victim's deaths.

Respondent urges

that this interpretation is not sufficient to trigger
Justice Whilte's Lockett rationale.

In listt 2f

~he

above

facts of appellant's participation, more must be alleged
than a weak contention that appellant left the room before
Justice White's test can be applicable.

Even if there was

enough evidence to support Justice White's test, respondent
would remind the Court that his opinion was not joined by
any other justice and cannot be considered as binding
Supreme Court law on its own.

Justice Hhite concurred

with the other justices in their opinion as to the defects
in admission of mitigating evidence as the key factor in
the reversal and then added his comments as to a co-defendant's
necessary intent to kill a victim.

Respondent agrees with

Justice Stewart that Justice White's opinion "represents
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only his views."

Andrews v. Borris, at page 14, advance

sheet.
Horeover, respondent submits that this Lockett
rationale is improperly raised here inasmuch as that
case was decided subsequent to the present case's direct
appeal.

(For a complete discussion of the improper

retroactive application of later case law, see Andrews v.
Morris, No. 16168, brief of respondent, at pages 49-55,
which respondent herein incorporates by this reference.)
Finally, under Utah law it is implicit that the
jury did find that appellant Andrews possessed a purpose
or intended to cause the death of the victims.

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) states that an actor commits first
degree murder when he "intentionally or knowingly causes
the death of

anoth~r."

This requirement was set out

explicitly to the jury in Jury Instruction No. 8 (R.35l),
and the jury's return of the guilty verdict on three
counts of first degree murder is proof that the jurors
found that appellant met this requirement.

This finding

by the jury is further enforced by the fact that Utah
case law requires that all evidence must be viewed in a
light most favorable to the verdict.

(See State v. lhlson,

565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977); State v. Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119,
499 P.2d 269 (1972); and State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292,
422 P.2d 196 (1967).)
'·.
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for habeas corpus, at page 9; Andrews v. Borris,
appellant's brief, at pages 22-23; and Andrews v.
Morris, No. 16168, filed Feb. 13, 1980, at pages 11-12.
Respondent makes these additional comments as
to this issue.

The method of execution claim was correctly

disposed of by this court, as a matter of law, as per
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878), and its citation
in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976).
~Court

The

analyzed the petitioner's claim that the

punishment of death under all circumstances is cruel
and unusual and ruled that this Eighth Amendment
prohibition only forbids excessive or disproportionate
penalties.

In holding that the death penalty does not

violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the high
Court acknowledged Utah's method of execution as being
a permissible means of employing the death penalty. This
recogn~tion

of Utah's acceptable method is further

illustrated by the Gary Gilmore case.

(See, e.g.,

Bessie Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S.Ct. 436,
50 L.Ed.2d 632 (1976), wherein the Court terminated
a stay of execution; Codianna, et al. v. Utah, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978), wherein this specific
issue of Utah's method of execution was proffered as
a violation of the Eighth Amendment, yet was not deemed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of sufficient importance to merit the Court's analysis;
and Andrews v. Utah, cert. denied 439 U.S. 882 (1978).)
Respondent therefore urges that this issue has been
well-considered and rejected by the Utah Court as well
as the United States Supreme Court.

Thus, a rehearing

should not be granted on this issue.
Respondent submits further that appellant's
argument that Utah's methods of execution are constitutional
due to "evolving standards of decency"

(Trop v. Dulles,

356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)) is misplaced.

Trop's oft-cited

phrase must be analyzed in view of its facts.

There

the Court determined that the penalty of divested
national citizenship for a soldier's desertion during
war time was disproportionate and cruel and unusual.
The imposition of the death penalty upon a convicted
triple murderer has been determined already to be neither
disproportionate nor cruel and unusual.

The United

States Supreme Court has not deemed Utah's method of
execution to be in violation of the "evolving standards
of decency" test in the three occasions it has had to
do so.

(See discussion supra.)
The appellant's reliance on Coker v. Georgia,

433 U.S. 584

(1977), is likewise misplaced.

In Coker,

the Supreme Court determined that the imposition of the
death penalty upon a defendant convicted of rape was a
,__
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disproportionate sentence.

Again respondent contends

that the Coker facts and the facts herein clearly
render the former's analysis inapplicable here.
Again, appellant argues he must be granted
an evidentiary hearing on the remotely collateral issues
of the degree of pain and suffering Utah's death penalty
will impose on appellant and the alleged Mormon doctrine·
influence as the basis of the death penalty's penal
purpose.

Respondent reasserts the sound doctrine of

Spinkellink and Andrews, both supra, as previously argued.
No evidentiary hearing need be held to develop facts
when the issues are legal and may be disposed of as a
matter of law.

Such principle is even more sound

when the "facts" appellant seeks to have developed here
do not even relate to the facts of the case.

These

"facts" are merely tangential, collateral after-thoughts
which appellant now seeks to employ as the basis of a
dilatory evidentiary hearing.

Such a basis for a hearing

cannot be allowed under the Spinkellink or Andrews decisions.
Appellant cites two articles, written by the same
author, as evidence of the "growing body of legal
literature" which contends that hanging and shooting
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition and that since
the "sole purpose" of Utah's death penalty is to satisfy
Mormon doctrine of "blood atonement" and "election of
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Responde

submits that this red-herring argument is forcefully
off-set by the United States Supreme Court rulings
rejecting similar claims by Utah petitioners (see supra).
In summary, this issue of cruel and unusual
punishment has previously been considered and rejected
by this Court.

The United States Supreme Court has

also rejected this claim.

Thus, it cannot be used

as a basis for a petition for rehearing.
CONCLUSION
The present petition for rehearing is defective
for several reasons.

Primarily, the requirements for

granting a rehearing--issues, law or facts which have
been overlooked or misconstrued by the court--have not been
met.

Specifically, the petition is defectlve because

the majority of the issues raised have been previously
raised, considered and either resolved or rejected.
The Utah death penalty's constitutionality has
been considered in earlier decisions of this Court and
the application thereof is consistent with State v. Brown,
supra.
The contention that appellant Andrews did not
intend the deaths of his victims has also been heretofore
analyzed and resolved in respondent's favor.
Finally, the claim that Utah's death penalty
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
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and unusual punishment has been considered previously
by this Court and such claim was rejected.
Respondent submits that the recent decision
by this Court in Andrews v. Morris, No. 16168, filed
Feb. 13, 1980, was correct and that a rehearing is not
merited.

Respondent prays that the present petition

for rehearing be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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APPENDIX A
FROM THE STATE OF UTAH'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI IN
ANDREWS V. UTAH
STATEHENT OF THE CASE
On April 22, 1974, the basement of the Hi Fi Shop
in downtown Ogden, Utah, became the scene of a brutal and
torturous detention, robbery and murder which left three
people dead and two wounded but miraculously alive.
Stanley Walker, assistant manager of the Hi Fi
Shop, in his early twenties; a nineteen year old employee
and part-time model, Michelle Ansley; and Cortney Naisbitt,
a seventeen year old relative of the shop's owner; were
taken captive at gunpoint into the basement of the Hi Fi Shop
by petitioners Pierre and Andrews (Tr.3069-3070), to facilitate
the methodical removal of virtually the entire inventory of
stereo equipment from the store for transport to a rented
storage locker.
Stanley's father, Orren lvalker, became alarmed
when Stanley did not come home for dinner (Tr.3060-3061).
His paternal concern led him to the Hi Fi Shop as he sought
the whereabouts of his son (Tr.30nl,3063,3067).
door of the Shop \vas unlocked.
much of the stereo

equip~ent

The back

He entered and saw that

which had been on display

earlier that afternoon was now missing (Tr.3064-3065).
As he approached the stairway to the Shop's basement,
petitioners confronted him with guns, and forced him down
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the floor, bound hand and foot, pleading with petitioners
for their lives (Tr.3073-3075).

Petitioner Pierre tried

to force Orren to give some unknown drink to the young
people (Tr.3077).

When Orren tacitly refused, petitioner

Andrews placed a gun at his head threatening him (Tr.30773078).

Petitioners then tied Orren's hands and feet, and

placed him by the others (Tr.3078-3079).
Like Orren 1-ialJ;er, Carol Naisbi tt became concerned
about her son, Cortney, \-.'hen he failed to return home from
an errand (Tr.2540-2541,2080-2081).

She sought her son

at the Hi Fi Shop at about 8:00p.m.

(Tr.l771-1772,2541).

Petitioners captured her at gunpoint and laid her bound
next to her son (Tr3080-3081,3083).
Eventually, in front of the others, petitioners
compelled Carol Naisbitt to drink a caustic substance, which
I

caused her to cough and sputter (Tr.3084-3085).

The substance was

later identified as sodium hydroxide, a chemical compound
with liquid Drano (Tr.2208-2210).

consiste:~

In turn Cortney,

Stanley, Michelle, and Orren were also forced to drink
(Tr.3085-3087).

Each successive ingestion caused coughing

and spitting, yet petitioner Andrews continued to pour and
petitioner Pierre continued to administer the corrosive
chemical (Tr.3084-3085).

Orren Walker, one of the two

survivors, tried to let the chemical slowly drain unnoticed
out of his mouth (Tr.3087); his forehead became scarred froM
lying in the resulting pool.

Apparently to ensure that

the Drane did its desired work, petitioners now covered
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Time passed but the five lived on.

Finally,

petitioner Pierre shot Carol Naisbitt in the head while she
lay next to her son (Tr.3101-3084).

Cortney fell next

victim to Pierre's gun, also shot in the head (Tr.3103).

Orren

Walker then heard a bullet strike the floor near his head
(Tr.3101).

Next, Orren heard his own son shot by Pierre

(Tr.3102).

Another bullet "stung" into Orren's head (Tr.

3103).

He began to do simple mental multiplication and to

move his toes and fingers to determine how bad his wound
was (Tr.3103,3105).

Pierre left momentarily, and Orren

heard Michelle ask his son Stanley if he were all right
(Tr.3102); Stanley \''as able to reply that he had been shot
(Tr. 3102).
Pierre returned,

unti~d

Michelle who had not been

shot and took her into a back room (Tr.3103-3104), while
Orre:r!:eisned death (Tr.3105).

1\hen she was returned she

was naked, raped (Tr.3106,3110).

(The State medical examiner

determined .sexual intercourse, post mort urn.

Tr. 217 6-2179.)

Michelle lay back down at her appointed place and was herself
shot in the back of the head by Pierre (Tr.3109-3110).
Stanley was then shot a final time; his breathing, which his
father, Orren, had been able to hear up to that time, now
ceased (Tr.3110).
Later petitioner Pierre tried to discern if Orren
Walker was dead

(Tr.3112).

He attempted to strangle Orren with

an electrical cord (Tr.3110,3ll9).

Only by carefully tensing
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tion attempt while still playing dead (Tr.3110).

The cord was

left so tightly tied, his head swelled (Tr.3119).

Orren then

felt a pointed object shoved into his ear and kicked three
times

(Tr.3111,3113).

(Tr.3124).

The object was a long ballpoint pen

Somehow Orren was able to keep from flinching as

he felt the pen go deeper and deeper with each kick (Tr.3112,
3113).

Finally, both assailants were gone.
After some time, Orren heard the voice of his other

son upstairs
were over.
hours.

(Tr.3116), and the hours of immediate terror
The entire episode had lasted approximately four

Michelle and Stanley lay dead (Tr.3120); Carol Naisbitt

died en route to the hospital (Tr.2543,3120).

Cortney survived

to face five weeks of coma (Tr.2546), five months of intensive
care (Tr.2551), several operations

(Tr.2544-2545,2548-2549,

2551), peritonitis (Tr.2550), blindness of the right eye (Tr.
2552-2553), partial paralysis of his right side (Tr.2547-2548,
2552-2553), and loss of

pa~~

lining (Tr.2549-2551).

As of the trial date, November, 1974, he

of his esophagcs and stomach

was still hospitalized, and except for water and clear liquids
was being fed directly into the stomach (Tr.2552).

Orren

Walker also survived to give his eye-witness testimony at
the trial (Tr.3057-3136).
Besides the personal account of Orren Walker,
witness after witness corroborated his testimony and
implicated petitioners.
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One witness overheard Andrews two months prior to
the crime state that someday he would like to rob a "hi .fi"
shop and would kill anyone who got in his way (Tr.l549).
Two witnesses saw both petitioners together in the Hi Fi
Shop two days before the robbery-murder writing prices down
and looking all over the store, even down the back stairs
(Tr.l578-1580,1588,1591-1592).
The owner of the rented storage locker in which
the stereo items were found specifically identified Pierre
as the person who had rented that particular locker the
morning of the crime, supposedly to store a car (Tr.l665-1670).
Over $20,000.00 worth of stereo equipment was recovered from
the storage locker which also contained a bottle of liquid
Drano, a cup like that used to administer the poison at the
scene, and personal ite1ns from the shop.
viaS

Much o:= the equipment

identified by specific serial number as having come from

the Hi Fi Shop (Tr.2447,2865-2885,2936-2955).

Personal items

like a one-of-a-kind sculpture, a towel purchased in Brazil,
a piece of broken display moulding and chairs were specifically
identified as corning fro~ the Hi Fi Shop (Tr.2917-2919).
A black acquaintance of petitioners' codefendant,
Keith Roberts (who was convicted of aggravated robbery but
not the homicides), saw petitioners exit

Andrews' blue van

about 5:30 p.m. on the evening of the murders, three quarters
of a block east of the Hi Fi Shop (Tr.l688,1700-1703).
Petitioners walked in the direction of the Shop while the
\·J.n made
u U-turn und drove t!Jat sC~me direction (Tr.l?00-1703).
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Another witness also saw petitioners exit the blue van and
walk in the direction of the shop (Tr.l689-1690).
Another witness saw Andrews' blue van backed up
to the rear door of the Hi Fi Shop about 6:30 p.m. and two
black men passing stereo equipment into it (Tr.l828-1830).
Another witness saw Carol Naisbitt enter the back of the
shop about 8:00 p.m. and specifically identified Pierre
as being at the back of the Shop somewhat later (Tr.l7711772).

Pierre asked the witness a question and she remembered

his accent (Tr.l721).
Trinidad

Other witnesses mentioned Pierre's

accent (Tr.l593,1667,3294).
While looking for empty deposit bottles, the day

after the crime, two young boys found purses, wallets, credit
cards and other personal effects of the victims in the trash
dumpster outside of petitioners' barracks at Hill Air Force
Base (Tr.2121-2129,2136-2138).
A search of Pierre's room at the barracks the day
after the crime yielded the signed copy of the storage
locker rental agreement, and articles from the Hi Fi Shop
(Tr.2467,2473-2575).

Andrews' room also contained Orren

Walker's watchband (Tr.3053-3055,3096), items from the
Hi Fi Shop (Tr.2582-2588), and surgical gloves

(Tr.2583).

(At one time, Orren Walker had heard sounds like rubber

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
gloves corning from
petitioners'
direction.
Tr.3094-3095.)
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain
errors.

Petitioners gave a portable cassette player to a
girl to "hold"; the stereo was from the Hi Fi Shop and
contained Orren

l~alker's

watch (Tr.2322-2323,2427,2940,3097).

Three vleeks prior to the crime Pierre was. even seen
at the movie "Magnum Force" a scene from which depicis a
pimp pouring Drane dow:1 a prostitute's throat to kill her
(Tr .1614-1615).
On November 15, 1974, petitioners Here found guilty on
three counts of murder in the first degree and two counts of
aggravated robbery; the guilt phase of the bifurcated capital
proceeding was concluded.
During the sentencing phase of Utah's bifurcated
capital proceeding, the State called Dr. Louis G. Moench
(Tr.4130), who had given petitioner Pierre a psychiatric
examination on October 14, 1974 (Tr.4130-4135).

The doctor

concluded that petitioner Pierre was able to distinguish
both legally and morally between right and v7rong and suffered
from no mental defect or illness which would interfere with
his ability to make decisions or to conform his actions to
what he perceived to be right or wrong. Dr. Moench also
stated that petitioner Pierre was of average intelligence
(Tr. 4136-4137).
Lt. John Farrer Regni (Tr.4138) was called by the
State to testify concerning petitioners' military
records.

Pierre's record revealed that he had wrongfully

appropriated an automobile from another airman (Tr.4152),
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(Tr.4153),

and \vas a "marginal performer" with limited potential as an
airman (Tr.4155).

Petitioner Andrews' military record reflected

a court-martial and time lost, a letter of reprimand for
leaving the scene of an accident (Tr.4142), another letter of
reprimand for leaving his appointed place of duty (Tr.4143), and
that he had t\.,.,ice failed to go to his appointed place of duty.
Petitioner Andre\vS was listed as a marginal performer and
of limited potential as an airman (Tr.4146).
The state also called Mr. Allan Roe, a clinical
psychologist at the Utah State Prison.

Hr. Roe stated that

during the past eight years, ten persons serving life
sentences for first degree murder had been released from
the Utah State Prison.

The persons released had served an

average of thirteen years, one month (Tr.4165), with the longest
serving seventeen years, and the shortest !line years, one month
(Tr.4171).

He also stated that three of .those released there-

after co!T'mi ttcd other r,mrdcrs.
Petitioners Pierre and Andrews then presented
evidence of mitigating circumstances.

Mr. Gerald Smith,

Ph.d:, a professor of criminology at the University of Utah,
stated that in his opinion, the death penalty is not a
deterrent (Tr.4197-4234).
Mr. Frazier Crocker, Jr., former chaplain at the Utah
State Prison, gave a historical overview of capital punishment, and stated that in his opinion, biblical text did not
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Petitioner Andrews then testified that he was twenty
years old; he was the youngest child in a family of five boys
and one girl; he had never known his father and his mother had
supported the family; he had run away from home when he·was
ten years old; he was taken away from his parents and reared by
an aunt and uncle until he was fifteen; he had received an
eighth grade education; he again ran away from home at age
fifteen and burglarized a cafe; he was in a juvenile detention
center for one year and four months; he then joined the Job
Corps where he received a general education

diploma (equivalent

to graduation from high school) and a welding certificate; he
pled guilty to auto theft in San Antonio, Texas, and was placed
on probation; and then joined the Air Force

(Tr.424~-4270).

Petitioner Pierre did not take the stand or present
further evidence of mitigating circumstances in his case.
The trial judge carefully charged the jury concerning
their responsibilities during the sentencing proceeding.

He

stated that the burden of proof necessary to satisfy the
jury that a death sentence was appropriate "'as on the State
(Tr.4273).

He further stated that all evidence received

during the guilt phase of the proceeding could be considered
by the~,

as well as evidence presented during the sent~ncing
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circumstances of the crime, the character of each defendant,

his background, his general personal history, and his mental
and physical condition (Tr.4274).

The trial judge also

enumerated for the jury the statutory mitigating circumstances
contained in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207

(Tr.4274-4275).

The jury determined that this was a proper case for
the imposition of the death penalty and sentenced petitioners
to death.

The convictions and sentences were subsequently

affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d '
1338 (Utah 1977), and State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d 709 (Utah 1977).
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